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Abstract
This paper begins by identifying two fundamental problems in contemporary British and
American secondary art curriculum: epistemological confusion and the absence of any
aesthetic component. This paper proposes a reformulation of art as an aesthetic cultural
accomplishment drawing on Kant’s theory of the aesthetic and symbolic representation as
discussed by Cassirer and Langer. This is followed by a comparative epistemological
analysis of art with Social Realist models of scientific knowledge. A case is made for art as
a unique form of knowledge, possessing both a subjective aesthetic basis and an objective
basis in its expressive form. The final section of this paper discusses the implications of the
proposed conceptualisation of art for the art curriculum, and proposes a model for art
education in schools that has the potential to solve the problems identified at the beginning.
Description of current confusion 
In his analysis of the 2004 General Certificate of Secondary Education
(GCSE) Art syllabus, Cunliffe finds several examples in the Assessment
Objectives (AOs) and supporting documentation, where pupils are required to
show evidence of contextual understanding in their artwork. Cunliffe rightly
argues that this requirement confuses practical or procedural knowledge with
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 Cunliffe’s use of these terms derive from Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) which1
proposes a concept of knowledge whereby its different forms arise from the different rules
required in their manifestation. This means that the main distinction between practical and
intellctual knowledge does not lie in their different sources (i.e. the empirical world and the
inner world of reasoning) as suggested in traditional epistemology, which Ryle criticises for
its dualism. In Curriculum Design and Epistemic Ascent in Journal of Philosophy of
Education, vol. 47(1), (2013), Winch makes a helpful distinction between propositonal
knowledge, skills, techniques and inferential capability. In a practical subject such as art, skill
is developed through a combination of techniques, propositional knowledge (both teachable)
and experience of practice (not teachable). The first two are governed by different rules and
criteria which mean that understanding of, for example, the social context of American
abstract art, requires expression in linguistic form and its concomitant rules and procedures.
This understanding, which is by definition conceptual, cannot be expressed through the rules
and procedures required by the craft of painting where imagination and intuitive feeling play
a larger role: these can be made manifest more clearly in artistic rather than linguistic forms
(this is discussed more fully in the third section of this paper, Art and Knowledge).
declarative or propositional knowledge.  Both cannot be assessed according1
to the same criteria in a single work (Cunliffe, 2005b). The assessment criteria
in the syllabus and supporting documentation, such as teachers’ guidance
notes lack the consistent linguistic clarity and logical coherence appropriate to
their status as official statements of curricular aims and evaluative criteria.
The AOs from AQA’s 2004 specifications for the GCSE Art syllabus are
present in current specifications of the Assessment and Qualifications
Alliance (AQA) and other British exam boards including the older Cambridge
and Royal Society of Arts (OCR) 2012. Thus the AOs analysed in this paper
can be taken as general, rather than atypical, features of British examinations
in art for pupils at the end of secondary schooling. The AQA’s introduction to
the Assessment Objectives states that evidence for their attainment should be
either demonstrable or measurable, which implies that there should be a close
correspondence between course content, evaluative criteria and form of
assessment. Such correspondence is not evident in the AOs in pages 1–4 of
the Teachers’ Resource Bank, Interpreting Assessment Objectives:
AO1 Develop their ideas through investigations informed by contextual and other
sources demonstrating analytical and cultural understanding.
AO2 Refine their ideas through experimenting and selecting appropriate resources,
media, materials, techniques and processes.
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AO3 Record ideas, observations and insights relevant to their intentions in visual and/or
other forms.
AO4 Present a personal, informed and meaningful response demonstrating analytical and
critical understanding, realising intentions and where appropriate, making connections
between visual, written, oral or other elements.2
Whilst AO3 is reasonably clear, other significant confusions support
Cunliffe’s central criticism that the GCSE art syllabus and exam contains a
fundamental confusion between different forms of knowledge. For example,
AO1 implies a considerable study of art history alongside experience of
looking at, and studying, a purposive selection of paintings. The term
‘investigations’ is left unspecified; it could refer to verbal or written
commentary or essay; the logically appropriate forms of assessing such
knowledge and understanding. But it is equally possible for ‘investigations’ to
be understood as visual, in which case it is not clear how analytical and
cultural understanding could be explicitly demonstrated or measured. This
latter interpretation is made explicit on page 4 where teachers are advised that
Candidates’ critical understanding could be embedded in the progress of their work as it
develops. It might be evidenced visually in the relationship between preparatory studies and
resolved outcomes. It could be evident in a completed piece of work.
The vague wording of AO1 risks encouraging the erroneous idea that
producing pastiches of particular styles of art is the same as developing
cultural understanding; and often this is done at the expense of pupils
developing more autographic works based on a thorough grounding in
appropriate skills (Cunliffe, 2005a, 2005b). AO1 and AO4 suggest that the
examination and course content supports a predominantly socio-cultural
approach to art but without requiring “assessment evidence that would
logically flow from the socio-cultural emphasis”. (Cunliffe, 2005a, p.201).
AO2’s claim that ideas can be refined through experimental practice and
selection of materials conflates mental process of thought with its physical
manifestation; this misses the intellectual character of refining ideas.
Thinking and doing need to be distinguished theoretically if each is to retain
its specific characteristics, even if they are almost inseparable in practice.
Artistic articulation, or expression, of ideas may be refined through the
practical process of making art (Hickman and Kiss, 2013; Reid, [1929]), but
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ideas per se can only be refined by the activity of purposeful thinking in some
form of internal or external dialogue based on concepts, reasoning, evaluation
and judgement. The content of artistic practice is not explicated; the only
further guidance is, “consideration might be given to the formal elements of
art, craft and design such as line, shape, tone, texture, colour and form and
how these might be most effectively used and explored”. The words
“consideration might be given” (my emphasis) indicate that these essential
components of art practice are understood as more or less optional extras. 
AO4 requires analytical and critical understanding, which would be
assessable in the form of either a written or verbal account based upon a
combination of art appreciation, and the sociology and history of art. But AO4
only stipulates “a personal, informed and meaningful response”, which could
apply to most assessment pieces and is thereby unhelpful guidance for
assessors. In short, neither the conceptual nor the practical aspects of art are
clearly understood or explained in these AOs.
Similar confusion exists in other places of AQA’s Art and Design
documentation. For example, the section outlining course content of the AQA
2014 specification, states that pupils’ portfolio could include: 
Critical and contextual work that could include visual and annotated journals, reviews,
reflections and evaluations, documentation of a visit to a museum/gallery or experience of
working with an artist in residence or in other work-related contexts.  3
This suggests that an account of a gallery visit constitutes critical and
contextual understanding. Whilst such work could provide contextual
information relating to pupils’ artistic influences, it is hard to see how such
documentation could be considered ‘critical’. Furthermore, educationally, this
is a highly contestable idea as it assumes that deeper levels of knowledge and
understanding will spontaneously emerge from everyday, experiential based
knowledge. Significantly missing from the GCSE examination and syllabus is
“The development of critical discrimination and aesthetic judgment-making,
especially the capacity to locate these in their social, artistic and cultural
contexts” (Harland quoted in Cunliffe, 2006, p.67). 
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Grayson Perry’s Reith Lectures: Who Decided What Makes Art Good? In
4
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/c37b1b6a-3017-11e3-9eec-00144feab7de.html#axzz2hhTN3Alz
Such problems in the British secondary level art curriculum are similar to
those in the corresponding American art curriculum (Barkan, 1962). The
absence of aesthetics in the sociology of art is discussed by De la Fuente
(2007), and in contemporary culture it is noted by the artist Grayson Perry
who cites Marcel Duchamp’s warning, “Aesthetic delectation is the danger to
be avoided.” Ruefully he remarks that making an aesthetic judgment today is
often regarded as “ buying into something politically incorrect, into sexism,
into racism, colonialism, class privilege. It almost feels it’s loaded, because
where does our idea of beauty come from?”  The next section discusses this4
question in reference to Kant’s Critique of Judgement ([1790]).
The intrinsic worth of art and Kant’s aesthetics
In Critique of Judgement, Kant ([1790]) insists that aesthetic feeling is utterly
disinterested; that is to say that the feeling of delight is prompted by the
apprehension of beauty alone. There is no invocation of morality, reason or
sensual pleasure; in this way the beautiful is different to both the agreeable
(that provides sensory gratification) and the good (which has an objective
worth set upon it). Aesthetic feeling may invoke thoughts as well as feelings,
but there is no causal chain of reasoning required. Aesthetic feeling is
characterised by a lack of conceptual thinking because concepts are
necessarily ‘interested’; that is to say that they are the link between external
aspects of phenomena and the internal experience of it (Kant, [1790]).
Aesthetic feeling or the apprehension of beauty arises from the free play of all
our cognitive faculties ‘at rest’. Our intellectual reasoning, our emotional
feelings and moral sentiments are not being consciously directed towards
some external empirical or logical object or purpose. Rather than the outcome
of using a process of logic or reasoning where mental faculties are focused or
directed towards a particular purpose, object or wider goal, our recognition of
beauty prompts imagination; and releasing perceptual and mental faculties
from everyday focuses and contingencies (Cassirer, [1944] Eiser, 2002;
Tallis, 2012).
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Applied to art, Kant’s explication of the aesthetic does not mean there is no
place for conceptual thinking. It is, for example, required in recognising the
representational content of paintings, e.g. landscapes, a female figure, fruit in
a bowl and so on. And to a greater or lesser degree, conceptual knowledge is
required in recognising the genre of the work, its chronological and evaluative
place in art history or where it stands in relation to an artist’s development.
But in experiencing an object as beautiful, it is the imagination rather than
logical or propositional thought that is appealed to in order “to refer the
presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure” (Kant,
1790, §1 p.44). The imagination is free to spontaneously suggest undeveloped
material (intuitions, feelings, moods), which is discarded by reason’s use of
concepts. Such material, when encountered imaginatively cannot add to
scientific knowledge or knowledge in the humanities. But the aesthetic
response in both the creation and appreciation of art can become the basis of a
deeper recognition or understanding of subjuctivity as the site of all
experience and cognition (Cassirer, [1944]; Eisner, 2002).
The epistemological ambiguity of Kant’s idea of the aesthetic has left it open
to criticism. Its autonomy or disinterestedness is mistaken for a rejection of
human characteristics; and its subjective basis mistakenly understood as
synonymous with being unreal and therefore amounting to little more than “an
expression of the common subjectivist-metaphysical assumption” that
separates the arts from “the whole complexity of life” (Best, 1992, p.34). It is
true that Kant’s account of the aesthetic is based upon individual subjectivity;
as is his account of morality in Critique of Practical Reason ([1788]); but
both arise from his attempt to uphold a sphere of autonomy to subjectivity
rather than uphold a subjectivist-metaphysical assumption per se
(Michaelson, 1990). His theory of aesthetics (and morality) could be
described as teleological in that an apriori faculty to recognise beauty is
implied; but this is located within human powers rather than those of religion
or nature. The profound humanism in Kant’s Critique of Judgment is evident
in his following summary of the aesthetic:
Only by what man does heedless of enjoyment, in complete freedom, and independently of
what he can passively procure from the hand of nature, does he give to his existence, as the
real existence of a person, an absolute worth. Happiness, with all its plethora of pleasure, is
far from being an unconditioned good (Kant, 1790, §4, p.5).
It is a clear affirmation of the intrinsic worth of being human resting in our
ability to do things ‘in complete freedom’, irrespective of whatever external
Cuthbert: Art education: a case of mistaken identity?. . .        21
Kant’s use of the term ‘interest’ is different to current meaning. He uses it to refer to the way5
a determinate concept connects external phenomena and inner will, direction of thought.
goods may be achieved. In insisting on the disinterestedness of aesthetic
feeling, and in debarring it from knowledge, it could be argued his aim was
not to reduce the complexity of the human mind to reason alone but to argue
for the capacity for aesthetic feeling as an intrinsic, human faculty.
Kant conceded that the autonomy of aesthetic feeling is reduced at the
moment of judgement. An aesthetic judgment implies a demand for the assent
of others, irrespective of whether a specific judgement achieves a complete
consensus. The idea of judgement in aesthetics is regulative rather than
stipulative, and involves practical acts of judgement making that in turn,
require propositional knowledge, and hence places necessary limitations on
the autonomy of aesthetic feeling. 
Another criticism implied in Best’s intepretation of Kant’s aesthetic
disinterestedness is that it is too focused on the isolated individual; as if there
was no social context. However, it is precisely the ‘disinterestedness’ of
aesthetic feeling – its independence of any individual’s particular interest –
that renders it imputable to everyone and thus it acquires subjective
universality.  Unlike objective universality in science, art’s subjective5
univerality is not generalisable: it does not require a single judgement to be
held by everyone, but presupposes common assent to the existence of a
standard of beauty. Kant’s idea of aesthetic judgement rests upon an implied
community of judging persons whose acts uphold a common standard; rather
than isolated individuals whose judgements have no purchase beyond their
immediate circle. His relocation of the source of validation of art to human
faculties instead of religious or cultural institutions introduced a new freedom
for artists as well as a new element of uncertainty. Questions of artistic truth,
how to achieve it in art and who was to legitimise its worth, had to be asked
anew, and in this way Kant’s Critique of Judgment influenced subsequent
artistic endeavour (Doorly, 2013). 
Kant’s work was directed more towards developing his philosophy of mind
rather than of art or education per se but his theory of the aesthetic has been
influential on later philosophers, including Cassirer and Langer, who are
discussed later. The next section considers art’s place in the curriculum.
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Although Polanyi claims the triumph of science due primarily to its role in industrialisation has6
also resulted in its instrumental valuation and one-sided development as it has became
increasingly divorced from a broader humanistic endeavour (Polanyi, [1958]).
Art’s place in the curriculum
Since the 19  century school knowledge has been primarily, although notth
exclusively, selected on the basis of its capacity to foster intellectual
development. The intrinsic worth of a liberal subject based education has
coexisted with other extrinsic values. For example, the application of
scientific knowledge increases human control over the natural world, the
humanities contribute to more accurate and nuanced understanding of
societies in different places and times, and the arts contribute to a richer, more
complex culture. The extrinsic values of education, have until recently, been
understood as arising indirectly, through its primary roles of intellectual
development and introduction to a public culture (Arendt, [1954]; Hirst, 1965;
Oakeshott, 1971; Peters, 1965). Due largely to its powers of generalisation
and application, scientific knowledge in Britain and America during late 19th
century/early 20  century, became the most valued form of public knowledge.th
In this process the arts have been marginalised in education not least because
they lack the epistemological characteristics that make science, and to a lesser
extent, the humanities, more immediately useful and valuable (Cassirer,
[1929]: Eisner, 2002.).6
There is an older philosophically distinction, going back to Plato ([420BC]),
between knowledge and imagination. Where knowledge derived from reason
has been closely associated with striving for truth, imagination’s expressive
power to evoke images and feeling immediately has aroused suspicion
because of its potential to distract from, or corrupt, reason’s search for truth.
Consequently the visual arts in particular have lacked the status of other
subjects Nauta, 2004). However, some philosophers have questioned this
understanding and lowly status of the imagination. Vico, for example,
regarded science as less certain knowledge than the humanities because the
basis of science is the natural world, which Vico wanted to uphold as God
given and therefore essentially unknowable to man. His phrase ‘verum
factum’ expressed the idea that knowledge in history and mathematics could
be more reliable or truthful as they are based on human societies and
institutions, or logical rules; they are derived from human and not God’s
design and therefore more knowable (Iheoma, 1993; Pompa, 1982). More
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recent anthropological philosophy and sociology has argued that visual
imagery of primitive societies had an important mythic function in creating
meaning and order; functions which later were adopted by language, without
which scientific knowledge could not have developed (Durkheim, [1915];
Cassirer, 1929): and in these accounts imagination is not so much defeated by
reason as marginalised. However it remains important as a complement to the
abstraction of scientific thought and in modern societies it has its fullest
expression in the arts (Cassirer, 1929). 
The application of scientific criteria and models within education has been
criticised for undermining a humanistic conception of education where all
forms of knowledge are valued for their intrinsic worth as well as their
indirect contribution to the wider common good as discussed at the beginning
of this section (Davis, 1999, 2013; Doddington and Hilton, 2007; Eisner,
2002; Scheffler, 1965; Standish, 2011). This is often attributed to
Enlightenment rationality, but Kant clearly states the need for limits, “We do
not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective
limits” (1787, p.11). Extrapolated to education, his caveat suggests two
things: that epistemological boundaries are respected, and that the intrinsic
character and worth of different forms of knowledge are respected. The earlier
discussion of problems in the British and American art curriculum suggests
that this is not the case.
Without a robust, and widely accepted, model of art education, which does
justice to art’s intrinsic character and worth, attempts to promote art and in the
curriculum have to find external, often instrumental, justifications. Recent
examples of powers imputed to art education are: improving mental health,
self-confidence and life-skills (Roege and Kim, 2013); or providing “students
with the freedoms, abilities and agency to choose lives they have reason to
value after graduation” (Maguire, Donovan, Mishook, De Gaillande and
Garcia, 2012, p.369). These arguments are often used in relation to education
for socio-economically disadvantaged groups in America and Britain. They
are also used in contexts of countries where education systems are being
developed to incorporate new economic and/or political imperatives. In South
Africa and India, for example, a Romantic, Dewey inspired idea of art as
individual expression, but located within a capabilities approach is being
promoted. This is presented as oppositional to both explicit economic
instrumentalism, and an unbridled individualism (CABE Report, 2005;
Maguire et al., 2012). Art’s main role in this conceptualisation is the
promotion of personality attributes considered valuable for establishing a
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See Gail Edwards Standpoint theory, realism and the search for objectivity in the sociology7
of education in The British Journal of Sociology of Education, (2014), for a critical appraisal
of Social Realism’s account of procedural objectivity, which she claims ignores the
requirement for diversity in process of reasoning to attain objective knowledge. This
criticism is based upon an idea of knowledge as the property and product of isolated
individuals, which is the opposite of a Social Realist concpetion of knowledge.
sense of collective responsibility and social unity. Consequently such
arguments could be understood as being socially, rather than economically,
instrumental. As previously noted, it is possible for intrinsic and extrinsic
values to coexist, but a necessary prerequisite is a prior existence of a clear
appreciation, and strong affirmation, of art’s intrinsic character and worth. If
this were the case today, art’s intrinsic aesthetic character would not be a
source of embarrassment or regarded as something to be disavowed, as noted
by Grayson Perry (see p.3). 
Art as a form of knowledge
The Social Realist account of knowledge is premised on Durkheim’s, and
Bernstein’s fundamental classification of profane/everyday and
sacred/academic knowledge (Durkheim, [1915]; Bernstein, 1975, 2000). The
main distinction between the two forms of knowledge lies in the greater
formal and conceptual abstraction of the latter. Concepts arising from
everyday experience are ‘worked upon’ by scholars; they are shaped into a
condensed language, and classified according to their inter relatedness; and
thus form distinct areas of study or subjects. Such knowledge is derived from
experience in the first instance (Oakeshott, [1933] 1966; Tallis, 1989), but
through collective endeavour over time, and public scrutiny, it acquires a
greater degree of precision, semantic stability and logical coherence than the
more contingent, context based knowledge used in everyday life (Moore,
2000,  2009; Moore and Young, 2001; Muller, 2000, 2012; Muller and
Young, 2007; Rata, 2012; Wheelahan, 2010; Young, 2008). School subjects
derived from such knowledge becomes the basis from which teachers can help
pupils think “beyond the present and particular” (Bailey, 2009). 
In the Social Realist account, objectivity of knowledge arises from the
sociality of its production in academic communities and wider public 
scrutiny.  Procedural objectivity creates knowledge characterised by the7
following:
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(a) Abstract form comprising of codified language
(b) Conceptual complexity
(c) Powers of generalisation
(d) Progression
(e) Criteria for evaluation
If art is to be considered a valid form of knowledge, it should have analogous
characteristics. By drawing on theories of symbolic representation and
aesthetic form, as explicated by Cassirer ([1929], [1944]) and Langer (1957) it
is possible to construct such an account without reducing art’s subjective and
objective bases. 
Abstract form and language in art
Symbolic artistic forms arise in the artist’s ability to create relations of
opposing abstract nouns: light/dark; heavy/weightless; opacity/transparency
or symmetry/asymmetry (Gombrich, 1984; Langer, 1957). In his discussion of
problems of representation, Cassirer explains that although in reality the
expressive and logical factors of signification are inseparable, their functions
remain distinct and the one cannot be the causal source of the other (Cassirer,
1929). The almost inexhaustible range of possible responses evoked in the
relationship between ostentive content and its expressive or aesthetic form
mirrors our experience of our internal life. The fluctuating and ephemeral
character of the structure of our subjectivity is given objective expression
through art’s aesthetic form (Cassirer, ([1929], [1944]); Langer, 1957), which
comprises of:
a composition of tensions and resolutions, balance and unbalance, a precarious yet
continuous unity. Life is a natural process of such tensions, balances, rhythms; it is these
that we feel in quietness or emotion. As the pulse of our own living (Langer, 1957, p.8).
These expressive effects have often been imputed to the psychological states
of either the artist or the beholder, which misses the vital mediation of artistic
form embodied in the work itself. It is this mediation that allows the
individual’s feelings and epiphanies to be apprehended within a universal
perspective whereby there is recognition of a world of feeling that we
experience as intensely private, but which all are able to experience. The
relational character of aesthetic form in a work of art creates a complexity that
makes a single, simplistic response difficult. Instead there is the possibility for
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reinterpretation, and the simultaneous presentation of contradictions that defy
everyday reality or logical thought. Caravaggio’s The Beheading of St. John
the Baptist (1608), for example, evokes both horror and intimacy through
obscuring a dramatic event in masses of dark space and shadow; the strength
of the executioner is balanced by the vulnerable body of St. John; and both
figures form a unity in their positioning even though logically, executioner
and prisoner stand as opposites. The painting’s composition evokes stillness
but this is offset by a visual rhythm created by the figures in the foreground. It
is the formal qualities of a work’s visual ‘grammar’ that simultaneously
evokes contradictory feelings of lived experience whilst inviting deeper and
continued contemplation and interpretation. Great art, by virtue of its
aesthetic form denies an overwhelmingly emotive reaction; this distinguishes
Caravaggio’s masterpiece from lesser works of the same biblical event.
Instead of catharsis we are invited to ‘feel at a distance’ (Cassirer, 1944). 
Aesthetic form, then, is not wholly a fixed, rule-determinable phenomenon. It
arises in the relation between representational content and the extent to which
the composition achieves a formal unity. In both its creation and appreciation
aesthetic form cannot be apprehended independently of the representational
content (which includes the content of abstract paintings), but in neither
moment is it reducible to representational significance. Perhaps in relation to
art, Kant’s (1790) use of ‘beauty’ is best understood as an expression of the
truth, or reality, of our subjectivity as opposed to truth and objectivity of the
external world.
Complexity and generalisation
The existence of aesthetic forms “presupposes an autonomous activity, carried
out over time, which consists in the building up, in the modifying, in the
decomposing, of things which we may think of as unities or structures”
(Wollheim, 1968, p.140). In a similar vein, Cunliffe (2013), following Steiner
(2001) describes the process of accretion as a combination of the artist’s
procedural and propositional knowledge from which an artist can develop
organisational depth in creating art. This allows an artist to know what to do
in the midst of creating and by implication to be open to possibilities
suggested in the manipulation of materials. The term ‘materials’ in this
context is not only the physical substratum of paint and canvas. It includes
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In The Method of the Social Sciences (1903-1917) Weber stresses that the fact-value distinction in
8
social sciences does not mean that beliefs and values are non-existant. He explains that they
operate at the initial stages of selecting, and defining the nature of, the initial problem to be
investigated. Subsequent work is then more fully subject to processes and rules which limit these
subjective elements. Polanyi’s account in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Critical
Philosophy (1973) suggests a similar distinction exists in the natural sciences.
aesthetic forms and grammar comprising of mass and volumes, shapes, colour
and tones. Accretion also includes a supporting armature, which includes:
cultural paradigms, moral purpose, types of practices, duration and methods of training, the
breadth and depth of the creative repertoire, the materials and methods available and used,
and the preparation, revision, experimentation that shape the final product (Cunliffe in
Addison and Burgess, 2012, p.180).
The starting point for this iterative process of artistic creation is the artist’s
initial aesthetic response to something seen, heard, touched, remembered or
felt. Without such a generative catalyst the artist may achieve a high level of
technical proficiency in his/her work, but it is likely to lack expressive power
(Reid, [1928]). 
The objective basis of art qua art is in the unique instantiation of artistic form
created by the artist. This uniqueness limits art’s powers of generalisation
compared to science. The variable, secondary qualities of physical phenomena
and the beliefs, values and feelings of scientists are reduced in scientific
methods but play a necessary role in art (Cassirer, [1944]: Gombrich, 1984).8
But this does not mean there is no capacity to generalise at all. The difference
is that science is concerned with generalisation in the external world, and art
in the internal world. For example, the complex and contradictory emotions
evoked by Goya’s painting of The Third of May 1808 (1814) include terror,
cruelty, pity, awe, and fascinated curiosity. These are feelings most of us will
have experienced at some point as unique individuals in unique situations and
relationships whether the terror of a child or morbid fascination of a bystander
looking on upon a tragedy. Goya’s painting, because of its expressive form,
can draw the beholder’s consciousness out from inner feelings – his/her
particular emotional state – and into a wider world of universal emotions;
here we can subject our aspects of our inner life to thought if we wish; and
can gain a certain degree of ‘mastery’ over our interior world. So art can
generalise but in a necessarily less stable and certain manner to other subjects.
The extent to which this capability of art is made manifest in a particular work
is one criterion by which we judge its quality and worth.
28        Journal of Education, No. 59, 2014
Progression
Knowledge in science increases breadth and depth of understanding of natural
phenomena as developed through time. Simultaneously theoretical
underpinnings of knowledge in science, and to a lesser extent the humanities,
also develop through the subsumation of particular phenomena to general
rules. For example, early astrology comprised of ordered symbolic systems
involving codified beliefs and mathematical calculations yet it remained more
akin to a systematised mythology in its personification of planets with powers
to influence human life. As it developed theoretically, astrology became
astronomy, and lost its mythical aspects. (Cassirer, 1956; Krois, 2009). 
Development in art follows the principle of extension rather than
subsumation. For example, Manet’s artistic innovation was not only in
extending the range of material suitable for artistic representation, but also in
breaking some parts of established conventional artistic schema. Through this
he managed to create fresh aesthetic forms that perfectly express his unique
sensibility towards greater individual freedom offered by modern French
society at that time (Nochlin, 1971). Such developments occur at particular
historical moments when various social and cultural influences coalesce; and
particular artists, through accretion, have been able to cultivate and create an
artistic response to something new in society. 
Criteria for evaluation
In addition to judging the complexity of aesthetic form in art, as discussed in
the previous section, socio-aesthetic knowledge is also helpful in making
judgements of new artistic developments. For example, the preoccupation in
20  century avant-garde painting with depicting flat spaces has been bothth
valued as expressing artistic liberation (Greenberg, 1961) and criticised for
abandoning representation, historically an important function of art as part of
broader humanistic culture (Steinberg 1953). Witkin (2009) argues that the
concern with flat space in painting since the mid 20  century expresses newth
aspects of social formation whereby the individual is denuded of subjective
depth by an increasingly bureaucratic culture. The ensuing existential
alienation is given powerful aesthetic expression in Rothko’s colour field
paintings for example. 
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 In Hierarchical Knowledge Structure and the Canon: a Preference for Judgements, in F. Christie9
and J. Martin (Eds), Language, Knowledge and Pedagogy, Functional Linguistic and
Sociological Perspectives (2007), Moore makes a helpful distinction between private opinion,
which is more contingent on the inidividual’s preference, mood alone, and judgement which may
have the same starting point, but is then subject to reasoning using public forms of knowledge,
and stakes a public claim. 
However it could be argued that subsequent trends in art show an increasing
concern either with technical innovation, or in extending range of
representation alone. In this search for continual radically new expression in
art, the artist, cut adrift from all artistic tradition becomes preoccupied with
trying to be innovative for its own sake (Bell,1972). The aesthetic component
of art is forgotten and becomes an easy target for politically motivated
criticism. The ensuing disregard for aesthetics form involves a loss of
interpretative potential. (Steinberg, 1953). This is problematic because
interpretation has an important role in making artistic meanings manifest and
in judging. The widest possible range of public interpretation and judgement
is required to ascertain the intrinsic worth of any artistic breakthrough
precisely because it has the largest subjective based component of all the
disciplines.  Interpretation in art is the main means of ascertaining its intrinsic9
worth and status – it is analogous to processes of verification in science and
without it the intrinsic worth of art becomes less discernible. Arguably this
describes the contemporary cultural landscape.
It has been argued that art complements scientific abstraction through its
emphasis on that which is particular and unique through the creation of
artistic forms, which have expressive potency. In this way art achieves a
formal rather than procedural objectivity (Cassirer, [1944]); and in place of
procedures of verification, art requires interpretation and judgement from the
public, and artistic accretion from artists. Art’s development occurs with
shifts in understanding, extending the range of representation, interpretation
and artistic symbolic language. In this respect art is an example a subject with
a horisontal knowledge structure (Bernstein, 2000). The final section
discusses the implications of this model of art for the curriculum.
Implications for the curriculum
This paper began by highlighting epistemic problems within the secondary art
curriculum in Britain, and by locating these challenges within a wider cultural
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and historical context. I argue that these problems require a revisiting of first
principles of art to establish its intrinsic worth; and a consideration of art as a
form of knowledge, and that it is complementary to science and humanities in
education. Art as symbolic representation, created through artistic accretion is
distinguishable from a prevalent understanding of art (and by implication art
education) as the direct, unmediated expression on the artist’s inner
psychological state alone capable of being directly understood by individuals
with the appropriate sensibility. This concept of art affords little objectivity
for art and reduces subjectivity to direct interpersonal relationships.
A model of art as an aesthetic object with subjective and objective basis is
proposed which is capable of being introduced to pupils in a systematic and
logically coherent way. The overall educational aim of art in schools is not to
create future artists directly, but to encourage a culture where art is
understood as having intrinsic worth. Its contribution to knowledge is that it
can provide the basis for a deeper, more nuanced understanding of
subjectivity, and strengthen faculties for imagination and interpretation.
It is from such a model of art that a more coherent art curriculum could be
derived. It would comprise of three main elements: explicit introduction to
procedures, techniques of drawing, painting and sculpture; art history; and an
introduction to contemplating, and articulating verbal and written responses
to, a wide range of works of art.
The introduction to techniques and materials of art practice would require
explicit practical instruction, propositional knowledge relating to the physical
properties of materials and how they act in combination, and plenty of time
for practice is required if pupils are to have an meaningful experience of the
craft component of artistic accretion. The component of art history contributes
to widening and deepening pupils’ knowledge of art as a valued cultural form;
and also introduces the idea of culture as a public phenomena, susceptible to
change and development. In conjunction with the third component, purposive
contemplation of exemplary works of art, it can help pupils make synoptic
comparisons and articulate critical aesthetic judgments. As discussed in the
first section, this is something lacking in most British and American art
education.
The selection, sequencing and pacing of the third component could, I think,
allow for a high level of individual teacher choice, as long as the selection
included examples from established artistic canon as well as more recent
examples where judgment may be less settled. Cunliffe’s work suggests it is
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 See previous section for discussion of language and grammar in art.10 This arises from the distinction between aesthetic feeling and judgement discussed in the11 second section.
quite possible to do this even at primary school level by drawing upon what
he terms ‘semantic differentials’ to guide pupils attention, and develop
percipience, when looking at art (Cunliffe, 1999). For this to be introduced
meaningfully requires teachers whose own familiarity and knowledge of art is
developed enough to be able to re-contextualise what they know at a level
appropriate for their pupils. By using a carefully devised set of questions that
elicit guided and graduated responses rather than directly asking pupils what
they think about a work, it is possible to encourage them to use their
inferential abilities through which all knowledge and experience is cognised
internally (Winch, 2013). Questions could be constructed that require pupils
to award a numerical grade on a scale (e.g. is this painting very realistic – 9,
or not realistic at all – 0) in order to direct discussion and implicitly introduce
appropriate vocabulary for discussing art. Specialised vocabulary could be
more explicitly rehearsed through commentary/essay type work where pupils
practice articulating their responses in verbal or written language.
There are implications for assessment criteria in this model of art education.
Current GCSE criteria stress personal development. It has been argued that
children, and teenagers, are capable of having a personal response to art, and
it is important they have the opportunity to do so. But a personal response or
development in art will be very difficult to ascertain, especially in younger
pupils, because their ability to externalise responses artistically is likely to be
limited by their level of technical mastery, their necessarily limited experience
of life, linguistic ability as well as having limited exposure to opportunities
for discussion in these areas. It is more important to ensure pupils are being
systematically introduced to examples of great art, and its language and
grammar in order to externalise their responses as fully as possible.  Whilst10
individual personal response, which arises from the subjective basis of art,
cannot be directly taught, the criteria, vocabulary and procedures for judging
art belong to art’s objective basis, and therefore these can be taught.  The11
task of the teacher is to introduce pupils to works of sufficient objective,
formal depth and complexity that even if pupils have negative, or very weak,
personal responses, there is enough interpretative scope in the work to justify
its study to make informed, discriminating judgements and to give reasons for
their responses in reference to the work itself. By refocusing on the objective
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Two recent examples that exemplify this trend are: the introduction of a joint Fine Art and
12
History of Art Degree at the prestigious Goldsmith’s Art College, where the ‘history’ begins at
1945; and the recent UK initiative Art Everywhere, which received support from the Art Fund to
put up over 15,000 billboards with enlarged copies of artworks for two weeks.
See Alka Sehgal Cuthbert, In Defence of the Public’s Judgement at http://www.spiked-13
online.com/newsite/article/13722#.UmvhciSezfY
and aesthetic forms of art, the pre-existing cultural capital of pupils has less
influence on pupils’ ability to progress in art at school, as implied in Bolton’s
empirical study (Bolton, 2009).
Conclusion
Contemporary cultural trends, which strive for perpetual radical innovation
and dismantling of classificatory boundaries between art and everyday life,
are highly problematic for art.  Social realist critiques of knowledge in the12
curriculum identify a similar trend: an inability or unwillingness to recognise
and affirm classificatory distinctions between academic and everyday
knowledge. Wider effects can be seen in the increasing esoteric nature of
contemporary art, the elision of art and entertainment, and in an increasing
gulf between contemporary art and the public. 
A mutually fruitful relationship between art and the public requires public
aesthetic judgement by critics, art lovers, art educators and students of art,
artists and curators rather than the more privatised agreements between
cliques of the cultural elites that seems to determine what constitutes good art
today; and who often sneer when the public fails to rally round their calls to
‘defend the arts’.  Without a defence of art’s intrinsic characteristics13
arguments for its inclusion in the curriculum can only be extrinsic (discussed
in section 3) which in turn can only mean its instrumentalisation with the
possible loss of the real value of art. 
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